15 October 2010

Bob Haldeman Interview (28)

Swent: At this point were you paying discriminatory rates? 

Haldeman: Yes. We were at 65 or 70 percent, and of course they can diddle 
you all the ways they want --exchange and everything. 

You negotiate that and get an agreement with the president, 
and then the president sends it to the Congress and says, "Take 
it or leave it. Don't negotiate and start to change commas and 
this and that," which they will do a little bit, but it's a 
package deal. 

We went over and talked to the president and told him what 
we had in mind. 


Presenting the Plan to President Alessandri 


Swent:
Did you talk directly with the president? 

Haldeman:
Oh, yes. Mr. Milliken, Michaelson, and myself. Milliken didn't 
speak any Spanish, and Michaelson said, "You talk to him, Bob." 


Swent:
You weren't speaking with his representatives? 
speaking directly with the president? 

Haldeman:
We went directly to him, and he congratulated us on our bold 
plan. He was an engineer himself, and he realized it was a bold 
plan. At the time, 1956, we estimated the cost at $200 million. 
If you take inflation and put it in present value, as the 
economists do, that's about a $1.2 billion investment. 

The president appointed the minister of finance, 
Mr. Figueroa, to strike a deal with us. Well, '57 passed, '58 
passed, '59 passed. We just couldn't seem to come to an 
agreement. What really was behind it was that Mr. Alessandri 
didn't feel he wanted to take that package to the Congress. 

I refer you to a book, [Frederick B.] Pike's Chile and U.S. 
Relations, 1880-1962, Notre Dame, 1963. This tells you why the 
Chilean leading class doesn't like the United States, by names. 
It's very understandable. 
 
 


American "gunboat diplomacy" ?  Baltimore became the flagship of the North Atlantic Squadron on 24 May 1890, and, from 15-23 August, 
conveyed the remains of the late Captain John Ericsson from New York City to Stockholm, Sweden. After cruising in European and Mediterranean waters, 
she arrived at Valparaíso, Chile on 7 April 1891 to join the South Pacific Station. She protected American citizens during the
 Chilean revolution, landing men at Valparaíso on 28 August. The events around this became known as the Baltimore Crisis. 
(click image for larger view)  
 
 
 
Don't forget that Chile at that time 
was an agricultural country. All of the gentry had big farms, 
were absentee landlords, and paid miserable wages to the people. 
They left the mining to the foreigners, the gringos. Of course, 
anything that upset their apple cart, they had to tax the 
gringos. Remember President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, 
which ended in Frei's expropriation of large farms. 


Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (27)

So we engineered a scheme wherein we went from the valley
floor and ran a thirty-kilometer tunnel. We would go right
underneath and hook it up and bring the ore out to almost the
valley floor, with a concentrator there. Our smelter was an
antiquated thing; it's still working today, but it was a
shambles . We would put in a modern smelter that would capture
the gas, acid, and so on, at about the 3,000-foot elevation,
very close to the mill. We would walk away from all the town
sites, all paternalism. From that town of Codegua to Rancagua,
which was a large open city, we would build government -financed
housing. We would put up the money, the workers would assume a
long-term mortgage, and then they would pay the government. The
thing was a very nice way to get out of your housing problems up
there.


"Our smelter was an antiquated thing . . ." (click for larger image)

It would take you about thirteen minutes to travel by bus
from the city to the tunnel at Codegua, another thirty minutes
into the mine, five minutes up the shaft. In fifty minutes,
you're at your working face. As it was then, it took you four
hours just to get from the city down, and from the working face,
five-and-a-half or six hours. Because of the concentration of
people of up there and the limited ability to move passengers on
that narrow-gauge railroad, we calculated that every family had
an opportunity only once a month to leave the camp. We just
didn't have any more transportation facilities. When there was
a snow slide, we were locked in for three or four days until we
dug it out.

We presented that plan to Mr. Alessandri in 1959. One of
the conditions we required was that we had some guarantee, say
for a twenty-year period- -they call them an ad referendum
contract, in which you sit with the government and say, "I want
nondiscriminatory treatment on exchange rate, pay the same taxes
as the Chilean companies." In other words, don't discriminate
against me; let me get into the community here and pay the same
as everybody else pays, guaranteed for twenty years. If taxes
go up for everybody, I'll go up; if they go down, I go down.



Sewell as parts of it were being demolished


Index to Haldeman Interview 

Bob Haldeman Interview (26)


The Codegua Plan to Modernize the Mine 


Haldeman: We devised what is called the Codegua plan. Codegua is a little 
town just a few miles north of Rancagua, the rail terminal. Why 
was it there? That was a natural valley. It went up and almost 
connected with the valley where El Teniente mine was. If you're 
looking north-south, Codegua was just about west of the mine of 
this little canyon that went up there- -but never connected over. 
To get to our mine, you went from Rancagua, went south, looped 
up El Teniente canyon, and back north to the mine. 

We were mining from Sewell, going in from level Teniente 5 
and going up. It's an upside mine. All the ore that we mined 
up above, we dropped in the ore passes, which was a primary 
crushing operation in itself. It went out to the concentrator 
here, and the concentrates were shipped by an aerial tramway to 
Caletones, about twenty kilometers down. 

We knew that by mining here by this method and bringing the 
ore out to this town, where we had paternalism, high costs, and 
people with social problems, the unions had everybody captive 
there. Socialists and communists dominated this union. People 
couldn't run away; they couldn't go out and spend a weekend at 
the beach, like they can living in Rancagua. They're held 
captive. If they want to have an assembly, they would knock on 
doors, get everybody out, and vote for a strike. It was a 
wonderful method. 

We figured that maybe by the year 1980 we would be pressed 
to feed this concentrator. We would be mining just about this 
level, and there was a tremendous reserve of a billion or two 
billion tons of ore below this. Sooner or later, sometime in 
the future, somebody has to go down to a lower level. You can 
go down in another level, from 7,000 to 5,000 feet, but if you 
went to Codegua you went to 2,000 feet, and there you had mining 
beyond the year 2100 if you wanted. 



Google-Sewell-Santiago


Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (25)


The Guggenheim Philosophy of Increasing Capital Value 


Haldeman: Since the Guggenheims took it over, they didn't take a dividend 
out for the first twenty-six years. They plowed everything back 
to build up the property. If you take that period of time from 
the beginning until about "55 or '56--I had somebody make a 
study for me--the return on the amount of money invested in 
dollars (not in present value) was something like 6 percent a 
year average. The Guggenheims were people like that, who would 
plow back and build a business. They weren't interested too 
much in the profit; they were interested in increasing the 
capital value. It's a different philosophy. Today you have the 
present value of money, and you want to get your cash out, get 
it back in, and roll it over again. Who's right and who's 
wrong, I have no comments on. 

Swent: Just different. 

Haldeman: It's entirely different. 


Solomon Guggenheim, Presdent of Braden Copper from the time Kennecott purchased it in 1915:




Solomon Guggenheim with the model of the proposed Guggenheim Museum in 1945:




Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (24)


Presidential Elections. 1958. Alessandri the Winner 

Haldeman: In 1958 we had presidential elections. At that time there was a 
great threat of Mr. Allende becoming elected. The other 
candidate was Mr. Alessandri. Of course, one of Allende 's major 
platforms was the expropriation of copper. It was painted on 
the walls all over the country. We were called every imaginable 
thing you can think of, having stolen I don't know what from the 
country, et cetera. Chile was still divided politically into 
thirds, and the Christian Democrat Party now started to bubble 
forth as a major faction in the center. 

Mr. Alessandri was the new president. At this point it 
seemed like new presidents were given the country with the 
coffers empty; they were broke. They looked for the greatest 
source of income--the copper companies, the major export. 
Sixty, seventy, eighty percent of their foreign exchange came in 
copper--two companies. 

Swent: Anaconda and Kennecott? 

Haldeman: Right. Of course, the president would call on you and ask you 
what you were going to do to for the country: if you can, 
increase production. We had been working it out in the 
engineering department since '55 or '56. I put it on a six-year 
presidential period, with a little bit for each president to 
satisfy him and increase the revenues. By the end of that term, 
they had already spent that, and you had to have something for 
the next president in the basket. We put it on the gantt chart 
and just programmed them- -something for each president. A gantt 
chart is a planning chart, where you put down critical path 
methods; it's an engineering tool. 

Mr. Milliken came down in the '56, '57, '58 period, and he 
said, "You know, we have a tremendous ore body here, but we're 
not really working it to its potential. It could generate much 
more." We were around 160,000 or 170,000 tons a year of copper. 
He said, "Why don't you put something on the board and see what 
you can devise. Let your imagination run away with you, even to 
dumping waste into the Pacific, 150 kilometers away, and see 
what alternates there are." 

Swent: Why would that help? 

Haldeman: If you expanded so big, there was no place to dump in the 

central valley, so you had to get out. Anaconda was dumping 
tailings in the ocean up north anyway. You have to get rid of 
them, and you can't put them on farm land. 

That was a think-tank arrangement. 
Swent: Bra ins terming. 

Haldeman: Yes, just to see what we could do. We had a lot of things on 
the board. Kennecott 's board of directors said, "Maybe it's the 
time we just take the step forward and make a bold move and 
present a very bold program to the government. Get our tax rate 
down and increase production, let the government have more 
revenues to keep them happy, and get some more profits out of 
the property." We worked out the figures. 

                                 Jorge Alessandri, President of Chile




Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (23)

Using More Chilean Engineers

Swent: Were you hiring more Chilean management?

Haldeman: No. At this time we talked over this as an issue, in 1955 and
1956. I had some fifteen years in Chile, and I became very
convinced that the Chilean engineer, the professional, who was
always held to the third-rate level with the foreigners holding
the first- and second-level jobs, was just as capable, didn't
require a three-year contract, didn't have to have a wife who
had to go home every two or three years, didn't have to have his
children in special Calvert course schools, and was satisfied to
work a lifetime with the company.

Swent: And already knew Spanish.

Haldeman: Yes. So we decided that we would start to train the Chileans.
I was having a lot of problems with the foreign service people.
They were demanding more and overseas premiums, 20 percent over
salary, just to go abroad.





Sewell as a World Heritage Site & a ghost town



Swent: Were they able to get good engineering training in Chile at that
time?

Haldeman: Well, yes. Their schools were turning out good people. At that
time the steel industry, Campania Acero Pacifico, CAP, was
plowing right ahead. It was a very top-class, iron ore mining
and steel company with Chilean engineers. The Chilean power
company, Endesa, had excellent people in engineering, operation,
and planning. The Chilean oil company, ENAP, had excellent
engineers. Mr. Simian, ex-minister of mines (who was the best
man at my second marriage), was the man who was on the first
well that found oil in the south of Chile. He was a mining
engineer in petroleum.

So there were excellent people. Of course, these were in
Chilean companies , and in the American companies the Americans
had the top jobs because they didn't trust the Chileans, if you
want to put it that way. They didn't trust them with
purchasing, because they always thought they were crooked. Even
today it exists to a certain degree. Canadians come down here,
and they don't trust the Chileans to have the purchasing jobs or
in the accounting and controlling departments; they have to have
their own men. I don't mind having two men, one to make major
decisions and one to make sure he has the key to the cash
register. But as for the rest of them, Chile has plenty of
capable engineers.

So we accepted that, and started to work on it in about
1956 and 1957. As we go along here, I'll start to phase in the
results of it.


Index to Haldeman Interview

14 October 2010

Bob Haldeman Interview (22)

Monthly Luncheons at Agustinas 1389 


Swent : What was the address? 


Haldeman: Agustinas 1389. It still has on the top part of the concrete, 
that not even Allende took away, that is in intaglio, indented 
Roman letters, "Braden Copper Company." 

I had the apartment turned into a nice big dining room, an 
office suite, another executive office, and a secretary's 
office. We had it all redone. We started the invitations for 
about sixteen people, 1:15 or 1:30 for cocktails in my office 
room, and the best catering service we could get. Then we'd go 
in and have lunch. We had oysters, lobsters, the best wine. At 
that time you were able to get good cigars. Of course the 
Chilean politician likes to live well, and I invited all the 
political parties. I even invited Mr. Allende, but he never 
accepted. When Alessandri was president, he accepted. Gonzalez 
Videla accepted, and, in fact, he invited me. 


Chilean President Jorge Alessandri

I started to know the political leaders of the country--, all 
political, economic, social, banking, et ceteraand I mixed 
them up. Mario Illanes was a wonderful diplomat; he knew how to 
handle them. Of course, the first lunches were just as dry as 
could be. They were waiting for me to ask for what I wanted, 
and nothing happened. I just asked a couple of questions, "What 
do you think about this?" and so on. Word got around that these 
were just social lunches, and they had good food, the best 
liquors you could imagine, nice cigars, there were a lot of 
enjoyable people, and Haldeman didn't want anything; he just 
wanted to know. 

It got to be that Mario had a waiting list to be invited. 
The guys would stay around until 5:30 and 6:00 and booze. The 
radicals were the biggest bon vivants of the lunches. I got to 
know people who to this day are still my friends. That's why I 

was able to open doors, 
I could even call up ministers and so on . . . 
 

Byron E. Grant; Modernizing the Management 


 
 
Haldeman: I had come to Santiago in 1955 as head of the company 
(Kennecott's Braden Copper Company--RS). About 
that time I needed a second man, and I started to interview 
people who were recommended through Kennecott, other executives 
who had Latin American experience and Spanish or something. 
After a couple of attempts at hiring people and not being 
satisfied, which took about a year or a year and a half, I came 
across Mr. Byron E. Grant. He was the man whose last experience 
at that time had been in United States Smelting and Refining in 
Utah. He came down for an interview, and we talked together. 

About this time I became very aware of the need for 
incepting modern management methods in the company. We had been 
quite archaic, and the world was slipping us by, being so far 
away from the modern world. Harvard had started up, and 
industrial engineering became the fad, and new organization with 
all of the frills. And Mr. Milliken was quite a bug on 
management . 


Kennecott President Frank R Milliken 

I talked it over with Grant, as I was very enthused about 
the idea of becoming a bit more modern and bringing ourselves up 
to date. Mr. Grant accepted the job. Of course, I was in 
Santiago, and he, being in Coya, had the day-to-day business 
with the seven or eight thousand people involved. I was in the 
political arena with the government authorities and the likes, 
trying to get our image corrected in the country. Maybe two 
times a month we'd get together and plan out what we wanted to 
do. 

We decided at that time to incept all of the new tools that 
were out on the market- -wage and salary administration, job 
evaluation, reorganization, warehouse controls, training 
programs. We started to plan on how we would send our 
supervisors, superintendents, and second-in-lines abroad to get 
some training and mix with the rest of the world that was 
spinning around above us. We were too far away. 

Bob Haldeman Interview (21)

Building Relationships with the Chilean Government 



Swent: How did you get these messages from them? 

Haldeman: When I got into Santiago and the general manager's job, I 
realized that I was still a foreigner, and I had to have a 
Chilean with some political know-how who would give me political 
advice and get me the contacts and open me the doors. 


Swent: Had Michaelson handed over anything to you? 

Haldeman: He was only there seven months. He just sprang in there and 
went out and left me. There was nobody prepared for that. 


Santiago view 1

Mario Illanes 



Swent: You had to do all your allying yourself? 

Haldeman: There was a man working in the office, a Chilean named Mario 
Illanes, who had been in the diplomatic service in the Chilean 
consulate in San Francisco and in Washington for several years. 
Turton had hired him to stay in Santiago and handle the 
politicians and so on, because Turton wouldn't work in Santiago; 
he wanted to live out in Coya in his nice house with a garden. 
So I got Mario Illanes, and I said, "Mario, I have to get to 
know the senators, representatives, ministers, the president, 
and all the businessmen in the National Manufacturing Society. 
I've got to get myself into the Chilean business and political 
whirl." 

Swent: Was there a Chilean Mining Society? 

Haldeman: Yes, but it was only mining engineers, and most of them were 
small miners. 


Santiago view 2


Swent: Your job was to get to know the Chileans, and about eight months 
of the year you were in Santiago? 

Haldeman: For about eight months of the year everybody was in Santiago. 
The other four months December, January, February, and 
March people started vacations, and Congress and the courts 
shut down. I said, "Every month, I'd like to have a lunch at 
the office." That was in the apartment they had built on the 
top floor of a five-story building in Santiago for Turton to 
live in. 


Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (20)

Tax Problems 



Haldeman: Now we came to a problem with taxes. Our taxes were way, way 
up. In fact, our direct and indirect taxes were 82 percent. 
The exchange rate was an indirect tax, and so on. 

Swent: Did they tax your ore? 

Haldeman: No, they just taxed all of the business part of the 
thing transfer taxes, exchange rates, import duty rates, 
corporate tax rates. Nothing to do with the ore in the ground. 

Swent: No severance tax? 

Haldeman: No. Of course, the companies were really groaning. The 
government needed some help from the United States , which used 
to give money to cover up the deficit problems. So in '55 they 
legislated a new law, Number 11,828, in which they reduced the 
tax rates for increasing production with certain investments, 
which was a very modest and nominal thing, but it got Chile off 
the hook. They had also accumulated an awful lot of copper 
there when they decided they were going to sell it through the 
Chilean Central Bank and give us the proceeds. They weren't 
able to sell it, as nobody would buy it. There was a blockade 
on the thing. 
 
Swent: Through the Chilean Central Bank? 




 
Chilean Central Bank Santiago, Chile

Haldeman:

Yes. So Uncle Sam bailed them out on the basis, "I'll pick up
the copper as long as you make a better shake for the copper
companies." They did, and that law came out. That also created
what the Chileans had always wanted to have, what they called a
Departamento de Cobre, which was a fiscalizing agency, an
overseeing agency that would centralize all of its activities on
the copper companies' exports, imports, profits, and all the
rest of the stuff. It was a watchdog kind of thing. That
satisfied an awful lot of political anger, because nobody was
quite sure whether we had a lot of gold that we were sneaking
out in bars of copper that we were shipping and not declaring.
Everybody was suspicious of everybody, so they just put up a
government agency. This was a watchdog, and you reported on
everything. We had to report to them. Finally it took the heat
off of us, which was very good.

Swent:
What were your relationships with the American embassy?

Haldeman: Very good.

Swent:
Did you work with Chile through the American government?

Haldeman: Oh, no. I worked directly with the Chilean government. At that
time, really the major export industries were owned by American
interests. There were the nitrate and the copper companies,
Bethlehem Steel, and iron ore. There was a big American colony
at that time. I was the second-most important man in the mining
industry and in foreign investments in Chile. Anaconda was
number one because of their size, and we were number two. I was
seated accordingly in protocol.

Swent:
So when they wanted to put the squeeze on someone, they went
directly to you and Anaconda?

Haldeman: They would do it through Congress,
have to enforce it .. . Then the government would



Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (19)

GENERAL MANAGER, CEO, VICE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR OF BRADEN 

COPPER COMPANY, 1954-1967 


Haldeman: Where were we? 

Swent : 
Turton died, and Michaelson moved to Santiago. 

Haldeman: As he moved to Santiago, I became general manager in 1954. 

Swent: Did this mean that you moved down to Coya? 

Haldeman: Yes, I moved to Coya, but I was there only seven months. I had 
furnished Mr. Turton 's house, and it was beautiful. Now fate 
comes in again. In the United States, Cox and Milliken had 
hired a man to be manager of the Western Mine Divisions. I 
forget his name. They didn't realize that the man had a bottle 
problem. About the third time he got off the plane in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and fell down the stairs, they decided that they had 
to let him go. So they called Mr. Michaelson and said, "Mike, 
you come up to the States and take over the job, and tell 
Mr. Haldeman that he has to move into Santiago. He will be the 
chief executive officer." 
 
Haldeman:  Here I was, thrown into politics.

Swent: This was in '54?


Haldeman: The end of '54 or the beginning of '55. I was thirty- seven
years old, the youngest general manager in the company's
history. Mr. Ibanez was president, and he was a very weak
president. He was a general of the army and had a second term.
The first term he had a military coup and took it over, but he
was voted in again for president, because all the people
remembered that bread only cost twenty centavos a loaf at that
time, and he'd probably get the food prices down. Inflation was
rampant.

Haldeman: Anyway, the general got in, and the government floated along
from '52 to '58. In the middle of that, in 1957 I became vice
president of Braden Copper. It was another title and a raise in
pay, and then I became a member of the Braden board in New York
but still staying in Chile. I received a decoration, the Orden
Al Merito Bernardo O'Higgins from the Chilean government, with
the rank of official. There was a ceremony with the minister of
mines.





Swent: That must have been a big thrill.

Haldeman: Very big thrill. It raised my posture and stature in local
society.

Bob Haldeman Interview (18)

Swent: Well, the prosperity is something to see.

Haldeman: We owe that to the general.

Swent: General Pinochet?

Haldeman: Yes. He was convinced that a market economy had to be
established here for the country to get ahead. He was smart
enough, like many great leaders, to get good young people around
him and let them go. They made a couple of mistakes, but they
didn't repeat them, and he prevailed. He didn't have to go
through Congress. He had his boys go out and canvassed the
world to find out what we had to do to be competitive in mining,
exports, quality control. Write the law, and he would sign it.
[Pinochet said] Labor- -what do we need in labor? Take all
the labor laws, which are all political laws and such a mess you
couldn't understand them. Just put them all to one side. All
of these laws were superseded by very simple legislation. You
can strike, and if you don't get a settlement by sixty days, the
employer has a right to hire new people and start all over
again. The first time it happened, nobody believed it and went
to see the minister, who said, "I'm sorry; it's the law." On
the fifty-ninth day, they signed up.


Augusto Pinochet


The employers started abusing the thing a little bit, and
the president said, "Now, come on. If you're going to abuse it,
we're going to doctor it and give the workers a better break.
What do you want?" He called in a pow-wow, a jawboning the
Central Workers' Confederation, the biggest union; the head of
the national manufacturing society; and the head of the mining
association, and private sector. They sat with the ministers of
finance, economy, and labor, and said, "You have to teach your
people properly. As the economy goes up, you--business--trickle
down. If you don't, I'm going to legislate."

So the bosses started to open up the trickle valves. We
haven't had a strike here in I don't remember when. Everything
is booming. In fact, we have trouble because there is just too
much purchasing power here. We can't get the inflation down to
a single digit just because the economy is doing too well.
Wouldn't you like to have that in the States? [laughs] But
don't shoot holes in it down here.

Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (17)


Some Thoughts on Chilean Politics 

Haldeman: We came up now to a little bit more political pressure of 
elections, and the left wing is drumming hard to take over 
copper. The political situation in Chile has been and still is 
divided in generally three groups. One is the extreme right, 
one is the center, and one is the extreme left. Each of the 
three groups has about one-third of the votes. 

Swent: So two-thirds controls. 

Haldeman: Yes. When Alessandri was elected, he was only elected on 

one-third, and he had to sue for peace to get a majority to give 
51 percent in the Congress for votes. And Frei was elected with 
plus-50 percent of the vote, but he didn't have a majority in 
Congress; so he also had to sue for peace to govern. Ibanez was 
the same way, and Gonzalez Videla was the same way. As I told 
you yesterday at lunch, we now have two-thirds, the left and the 
center, who were always fighting, both against the right third. 
They are now together, sharing the glory of what the military 
did to reestablish a free, open-market economy here. As long as 
they can stay together, we are not going to have a problemif 
they can just keep the GNP [gross national product] at 6 percent 
a year. A man would have to have a gun at his forehead and pull 
the trigger to upset the apple cart and destroy the balance of 
this thing. It's working. The socialists, the left wing, the 
center left, and the Christian Democrats realize that this 
market economy is the best thing to increase the standard of 
living for the whole country. I hope they can get another 
generation coming through that, who will vote that way. Then I 
don't care what the parties are called, they're going to be 
voting for a good economy, and politics secondly. 


Chilean President Eduardo Frei Montalva


Swent: Which, as you were saying, is quite a change for Latin America.

Haldeman: Absolutely. And they're very proud of it. They don't want
anybody to come back and say, "Hey, you fell back, just like
Peru or Bolivia." No, "I want to be the leader." The national
pride here is going to keep that alive for quite awhile, I hope.

Swent: We might interject that it's hard to find a quiet place in this
city, with all the construction going.


Haldeman: It's wonderful. It's jobs.

Swent: I've never seen so much construction in my life. It's all day
and all night in every block.

Haldeman: Good.

Swent: Tremendous prosperity.

Haldeman: That means TV sets, a new stove for the wife, clothes for the
kids, and so on, for our workers.

Swent: The people on the street are so well dressed.

Haldeman: It's awfully hard to get a strike nowadays. People don't strike
any more; they make too much money. It's wonderful.



Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (16)

Relations with Anaconda Copper Company

Swent: You mentioned Anaconda- -did you get together at all with the
Anaconda management to discuss problems?

Haldeman: No. We were competitors, although friendly competitors. A lot
of things Anaconda did, we didn't agree with eye-to-eye, so we
would have to let them go their own way. They played a lot more
politics than we did. And, of course, we were isolated. The
offices in Santiago, sure, they got together. You're always
listening with one ear and trying to hear the conversation on
the other side with the other ear. We were not against or have
any fights with Anaconda except in the last days, when they were
very bitter at us for our selling 51 percent of the company to
the Chileans. I'll get to that later on.

Swent:
Did you get into Santiago very much for socializing?



Haldeman: 
No, I did no socializing at all in Santiago. I vacationed in
the States with the family and went up to see my wife's mother,
my mother, who was still alive at that time, and my wife's
brothers and sister. I was a typical U.S. expatriate working
abroad. The Chilean market didn't have much in clothing or
bedsheets and so forth. So when we went up to the States for a
three-months' vacation every three years--. I shortened the
contracts to two years with two months' vacation to get the guys
out more to the States, and they would come back loaded with
things. We'd send a truck down, and all that stuff. We
imported Arrow shirts.

Sewell American sector


  Swent: I came down on the plane this week with some fellow who was
carrying four lampshades by hand. [laughter] So it still goes
on.

Haldeman: It still goes on. Goods imported from the U.S., people just
love to have them and show them off in their houses. That's why
I have no worry about this North American Free Trade Agreement
[NAFTA]; we'll be money ahead. The more they can buy our goods,
and they love them and let them manufacture it down here, and
they can buy it here with our label on it. The Japanese do it.
Mr. [Ross] Perot doesn't quite agree with me.

Turton passed away, and Michaelson had to go to Santiago.
Turton never did want to go. The New York board of directors
wanted to have somebody for political representation. By this
time we were having problems with our tax rates going up. The
Chilean Congress was starting to levy more burden on the copper
companies to finance the budget deficits rather than try to
develop new business atmosphere. It was just the contrary; it
discouraged new business to come in, because they were treating
the existing businesses badly. That's the way it went.






Index to Haldeman Interview 

Bob Haldeman Interview (15)


Self-Contained Camp 

Swent: What about health care? 


Haldeman: We had very good medical service. It was excellent. We had 
what they call "womb to tomb" philosophy in everything; 
paternalism to the nth degree. 

Swent: Company doctors, company hospital-- 

Haldeman: Everything. A hospital in every town site. We took care of all 
of the people. We had some excellent doctors, all Chilean 

Haldeman: 

. . . We imported, without any question as to cost, everything 
they needed. Many people in Santiago would call up and ask if 
they could send their kid up to Sewell to have him operated on. 
So did Anaconda, because we both had to be self-contained. The 
Chilean national health service--government socialized 
medicine--at that time was very substandard. 

So we did a very good job on that, 
and still do today. 


Swent:
You had your own schools, too? 

Haldeman:
The company always did.
We had public schools there, and for the foreigners we had the 
Calvert system. My boys went to the Calvert school in the 
mining camp, and when I moved to Santiago we put them into a 
British boys' school, the Grange. 

Swent:
Did your wife teach, or did you hire teachers? 

Haldeman:
No, the wife of the safety director, the wife of the mill 
superintendent, and the wife of this and that who had experience 
in teaching before in their lives took over the teaching jobs. 
They did a real good job. 

Swent:
Did the company pay them? 

Haldeman:
Yes, a modest, nominal sum, and gave them all the equipment they 
needed. And we gave all medical and other paternalistic 
services to the teachers that the government sent to the public 
schools, and we helped them out with supplies, because the 
government was short on that, too. There are an awful lot of 
indirect subsidies that you have to get along with. We also had 
quarters for the police force; we gave them housing. We had 
18,000 people in our town sites, and we gave them everything, 
plus all the 18,000 complaints that you can imagine. Everything 
you get for nothing is not very good. If you have to buy it 
yourself and take care of it yourself, it's not bad; even though 
it's lousy, you don't complain. [laughs] 


Sewell scene

Swent: So now as superintendent you were getting into all of this. Haldeman: Oh, when 1 got into management, the women used to call me up and say, "The welfare department hasn't changed the light globe in my basement now in three weeks." Oh, dear. And I'm supposed to be taking care of producing copper.
 



Index to Haldeman Interview 

Bob Haldeman Interview (14)


GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT OF OPERATIONS, 1952 

Learning Diplomacy 

Haldeman: All of the departments were managed by Mr. Turton's old cronies 
and buddies, and each man had a little empire. They just didn't 
think anything about this young whippersnapper who was coming 
around. I had to sit for an hour in the mill superintendent's 
office, waiting for him to receive me and then sit back and say, 
"What do you want to know?" I remembered Machiavelli's book and 
the rule that the new prince always decimates the other princes 
and puts his own people in. So I had to start, bit by bit, to 
assume management. I was the general superintendent, and these 
fellows had to report to me. It took an awful lot of diplomacy. 

Swent: Had you had any formal training in management? 

Haldeman: In those days management was not what you call management 
today.. . Harvard Business School and management classes in 
universities. No, I learned engineering, mining, geology, and 
metallurgy, period. I never had a course in management, much 
less a course in politics, an area I will get into. 

Swent: Had management even been mentioned as something that you would 
need to be aware of? 

Haldeman: In the fifties, Harvard Business School suddenly became 
important in all of the business world. Prior to that, 
businesses were run by old-time managers. It was only in the 
forties and the fifties there was a sudden awareness of 
industrial engineering and the likes that became a tool of 
management . Then came all of these management training schools . 
This all started about the time I was stepping out of the mine 
and into management with absolutely no background in it. Nobody 
else did in the company. [laughter] 
 

Swent: You were so isolated up there, you probably weren't aware of the 
domestic politics either. 

Haldeman: No, absolutely not. I was isolated in the mine, with American 
town sites, American management, and 1 wasn't aware of any 
politics going on. 



View of Sewell from below 
(click for larger image)
 
General Manager Franklin D. Turton 

Haldeman: About this time Mr. Turton passed away. He died at Coya, the 
town where the management office was. Mr. Michaelson had to go 
to Santiago to take the head job. Turton never wanted to. 
Stannard tried to get Turton to go to Santiago, and he built a 
building there with an apartment in it. But Turton had a 
beautiful house in Coya with a big garden and fruit trees. He 
was out at the mine, and he said, "I'll go to Santiago over my 
dead body," and that's exactly how he went. He died of a heart 
attack while he was out in the garden, propping up his fruit 
trees after a windstorm. 

Turton was a character and a wonderful man. He built up 
the company. We used to have nail factories and made our own 
stationery and form books and everything, because you had to be 
independent to do it. Sometimes it took eighteen days by boat 
to get instructions down from the United States. You can't run 
a company that way. Sometimes the telephone didn't work; . 
sometimes the manager had so many problems that he didn't answer 
the telephone. [laughs] There wasn't any fax or anything like 
that. Those were different days. We even made our own coffins. 
You had to be self-contained. 
 
 



Area map showing Sewell   (click for larger image)


Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (13)


Sewell night scene

Charles D. Michaelson Haldeman: It's now 1951, and Mr. Milliken hires a Mr. Charles D. Michaelson, who had experience in Bolivia with the Patino group and in Cuba with a nickel company. He sent Mr. Michaelson down to Chile to train to take over Mr. Turton's job. Mr. Turton also was about the age of Mr. Stannard, and Turton had never really prepared any number two man young enough. He grew up with his cronies and stuck with them. He was the old, old school: "That's the way we do it," and "the rock in the box" thing. Forming management groups ten years apart for succession was something he didn't bother with; that wasn't management at that time. Mr. Michaelson came down here, and I think his job was general superintendent of operations, or about at that level. He saw that there was nobody below him, so he started to look around the company. After he got oriented, he started inviting me to have a martini in the afternoon and asked me about the mine. The next thing you know, I was called in by the manager. I was told after wards that Mr. Turton had also put an eye on me. He said he liked me because 1 also came from the mine; he was a mine man, and that had a lot to do with it, then. I was taken out of the mine as number two to Mr. Casarotto and put in as assistant to the general manager, in training. Well, that was a title that was created, and I was working under Michaelson 's wing. In 1952, after four or five months of training, they named me as general superintendent of operations and Mr. Michaelson as assistant general manager. I had to go around and learn what the smelter was like, and the shops and the railroad and so on. 
 


Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman interview (12)



Salvadore Allende rallying the masses


Haldeman: Let me go into the political side of the story. About this
time, I'm getting up in management, and I'm becoming very aware
that there is a growing movement in Chile to say that the copper
should be in the hands of the Chileans. This is a backlash
imitating what was going on over Latin American oil in Brazil
with Petroleo Es Nosso and in Venezuela. The oil companies were
trying to negotiate a graceful exit. This was the anti- capitalistic theme,








and that's when the left-wing parties,the socialists, and the communists started to become very important.


They believed that the countries should own their own natural resources. This is going to be threading through the story as we go along. It began to have more and more effect on mining and my involvement in the company.


Index to Haldeman Interview

Bob Haldeman Interview (11)

ASSISTANT GENERAL MINE FOREMAN, 1951 
Far-Reachine Effects of Plane Crash in Canada. 1949 

Swent: You were assistant mine foreman in 1951. 

Haldeman: Yes, I was being considered for that. In 1950 comes another act 
of the fairy of fate. Kennecott's Mr. Stannard, who I met when 
I first came down, plus two of the key executives were getting 
along in years, and the board of directors said, "You have to 
replace yourselves with younger people." 

Haldeman: At that time Kennecott had acquired controlling interest in a 
mining company in Canada, Quebec Iron and Titanium. 

Swent: You were working for Braden Copper Company, which was a 
subsidiary of Kennecott, so it was natural for them to turn 
here--? 

Haldeman: Yes. They had a reorganization policy that the board had 
insisted on that they get some younger people in the top 
positions. The incoming executives, with the outgoing 
executives, took a plane to fly up to Canada. On that plane was 
the wife of a postman who was fed up with her, and she was going 
up to visit some relatives in Quebec. He put a bomb in her 
suitcase. 

Swent: Oh, I didn't know that caused the crash. 

Haldeman: They all went down--the wife and all of the outgoing and 
incoming executives; Stannard was one of the outgoing and Frost 
was one of the incoming. Kennecott was absolutely decimated; 
they had nobody to run it. 




Swent: To this day most mining companies don't send all of their 
executives in the same plane. 
 
Haldeman: That's exactly the reason; that started the policy.
 
Swent: It was a terrible thing. When was that? 
Haldeman: It was 1950. 

Charles Cox was taken from a steel company; I don't know if 
it was U.S. Steel or not. He was a financial man, and he was 
brought in as president. I think a year later he picked up 
Frank Milliken from New Jersey Zinc and put him in as number two 
man. 



Winter Scenes from the CRNW Railway

Kennecott in winter

Above:  Kennecott, CRNW MP 195  in the 1930s
Below:  Digging out the passenger train near MP 34-40, Hot Cake channel area of the Copper River delta  (click either image for much-larger view)

diggout out

Below: A rotary snow plow emerges from the snowshed at  CRNW MP 54 along the Abercrombie Rapids channel. (click for much-larger view)

rotary at snowshed 54

The CRD Five-Year Expansion Plan

The proposed Copper Rail Depot in Ron's Five-Year Plan compared to The Brick, Roslyn, Washington, scene of the outdoor filming of Northern Exposure--a central theme of the large-scale model railroad @ the CRD: 
It is only vaguely similar, but THAT is close enough. The tourists probably won't know the difference. 

comparison